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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jeremy V. Guzman appeals from the

district court’s

argues that the district court violated his Fifth

Amendment

order relinquishing jurisdiction.

rights

by relinquishing

its

He

jurisdiction

because he failed to submit t0 a psychological/psychosexual evaluation and associated polygraph
examination.

He

also contends that his

failed t0 preserve letters

due process rights were violated because the

of support ﬁled With the

district court

district court

and considered by

it

at the

jurisdiction review hearing.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

Jeremy Guzman sexually abused

Proceedings

his girlfriend’s

over several months, With each occasion lasting “4 0r 5 hours

Guzman was
pp. 45-47.)

He

at a time.” (PSI, p. 44.

1)

charged with four counts 0f lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.

(R.,

agreed t0 plead guilty to one count, encompassing the same conduct originally

charged as four, With the
district court

niece four or ﬁve times

state

agreeing t0 dismiss the remaining counts.

(R., pp. 51-53.)

The

accepted Guzman’s guilty plea (R., pp. 60-61) and dismissed the other three counts

(R., pp. 66-67).

Prior to

sentencing,

Guzman

submitted to a psychological/psychosexual evaluation

(“PSE”) and polygraph examination (PSI, pp. 13-36), signing a waiver 0f his Fifth

1

Citations to ‘PSI’ are to the

Which includes,

document

titled

inter alia, the Presentence

Amendment

“Conﬁdential Documents Appeal Volume 1.pdf,”

Report and

attachments (PSI, pp. 42-88), as well as
both psychological/psychosocial evaluations completed by Guzman (PSI, pp. 13-36, 111-3 1).
its

right to

remain

silent (PSI, pp. 24-26).

The PSE indicated

that

Guzman was

“at average 0r

moderate risk 0f sexual recidivism” and in need of “sex offender treatment.” (PSI,

p. 13.)

The

polygraph examination involved three “relevant questions” that were tested for truthﬁllness:

Do you have more

1.

sexual Victims then

[sic]

you have

told

me

about today?

Have you purposely Withheld information from me today about

other

Victims?

Do you have any Victims

3.

in [sic]

Which you sexually assaulted With the use

0f physical force?
(PSI, p. 3

were

1 .)

‘no’ to all three,

Guzman responded

and the examiner determined

that the responses

truthful. (PSI, pp. 3 1-32.)

At

sentencing, the district court acknowledged having read letters 0f support from

“Nesha

Green, Jerry Guzman, Michael Guzman, Joseph Guzman, Sandy Taylor, and Diane Guzman.”

(TL, p.

6, L.

24 —

The court then imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f twenty—ﬁve years

p. 7, L. 2.2)

With four years ﬁxed, but retained jurisdiction for a year.

judge noted that the

20 —

p. 18, L. 7.)

for probation,

PSE

(T12, p. 17, Ls. 10-19.)

reﬂected an “unacceptable risk” that he would reoffend. (TL,

The judge explained

that while

Guzman was

he would consider the possibility of probation

examination represented that

I

In doing so, the

Guzman posed

p. 17, L.

therefore not presently a candidate

if

a subsequent

PSE and

polygraph

a signiﬁcantly reduced risk 0f reoffending:

won’t consider probation a year from now when you come back if you
a full disclosure polygraph and another complete sex offender

don’t have

assessment, and one that indicates that you’re at the 10W end of risk t0 reoffend in
a sexual way. Right
at

now

I

an unacceptable risk for

don’t have an evaluation that’s in the ballpark. You’re

me

as a judge to put

probation’s not even an option right now, and

come

back, and again

I’ll

talk

you back out

it

some more about

in the

community, so

might not be an option when you
that here in a minute, but I need

an assessment sometime in the future that indicates that you’re

at

a 10W risk to

reoffend and the reasons Why.

2

Citations t0 “Tr.” are t0 the

for the sentencing hearing

document

titled

“46401.PDF,” which contains both the

and the jurisdiction review hearing.

transcript

The judge cautioned Guzman not

(Id.)

he would do so

reiterated that

evaluation, veriﬁed

by a

full

be surprised

t0

Guzman

if

did not

if

he

later relinquished jurisdiction,

“come back here with

disclosure polygraph that

comments 0n

a

and

new psychosexual

why [Guzman]

the reasons

did this horrible act over time, 0n a repeated basis” (TL, p. 20, Ls. 7-20), and that demonstrated

that

he “learned enough to put those things behind [him] and that

(TL, p. 21, Ls. 16-24). Finally, in

its

[he’s] a

low

sentencing order, the district court stated:

risk t0 reoffend”

“THIS

COURT

WILL NOT CONSIDER PROBATION AT THE END OF THE PERIOD OF RETAINED
JURISDICTION WITHOUT A

NEW

PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION.”
At

FULL-DISCLOSURE POLYGRAPH AND

(R., p.

69 (capitalization and bold font in

NEW

original).)

the jurisdiction review hearing, the district court ﬁrst acknowledged having read a

number 0f documents, including “a ﬁling on August 2nd,
from Joseph Guzman, a

letter

Nesha, N—e-s—h-a, Green, and a

from Jerry Guzman, a
letter

a letter from Sandy Taylor, a letter

letter

from Diane Guzman, a

from Terry Guzman, so I’ve read

all

letter

from

of those as well.”

(T12,

p. 27, Ls. 11-18.)

The court then
20 —

p. 28, L. 6.)

stated that

According

it

had determined

t0 the court,

it

to relinquish

its

did so because the only

jurisdiction.

PSE

(TL, p. 27, L.

presented to

it

a “moderate risk of sexual recidivism,” Which the court considered “entirely too high.”

court

was “hoping

[his] risk,”

but

that

when [Guzman] came back

Guzman had

not provided one.

Guzman’s crime, involving sexual abuse of a
lasting “four to

ﬁve hours

at

it

would

rely

The

would have a new assessment of

The court noted

trusting Victim

(Id.)

on

the “shocking” nature of

at least four different occasions,

a time” while the Victim “watched the clock go as [Guzman] did this

t0 her.” (TL, p. 28, Ls. 16-25.)

PSE,

(Id.)

that [he]

indicated

The court

stated that because

Guzman had

not completed a

on the previously completed PSE and had “zero more insight

new

as to the degree

of risk that [Guzman] would pose t0 the public, other people, so those are the reason
relinquishing jurisdiction.

gauge that

[The court] just [did not] have any other basis

risk.” (T12, p. 28, L.

25 —

performed.”

Guzman

(TL, p. 29, Ls. 12-18.)

determination, but

pp. 78-79.)

Guzman

The

district court stated that

it

p. 29, L.

19

— p.

its

jurisdiction,

would not reserve
in support

its

of a motion

30, L. 6.)

and imposed the underlying sentence.

On

Guzman

the

same day

that

(R.,

he appealed the

ﬁled a motion under Idaho Criminal

(R., pp. 80-81.)

He

subsequently completed a second

PSE and

polygraph examination

(R., pp. 111-31),

again acknowledging that he was waiving his right to remain silent (R., pp. 122-23).

PSE

time to

could “get those evaluations ordered and a polygraph

timely appealed. (R., pp. 82-85.)

order relinquishing

was]

would reserve a ﬁnal determination on

court

district court relinquished its jurisdiction

district court’s

Rule 35.

if the

would consider a new PSE and polygraph examination

under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (TL,

The

at this point in

[it

p. 29, L. 6.)

Guzman’s counsel then asked
relinquishing jurisdiction until

Why

indicated that

Guzman was

“at

low-moderate risk of sexual recidivism.” (PSI,

The second
p. 111.)

The

second polygraph examination asked the same three “relevant questions” as did the ﬁrst
examination, to which

answered

At

truthfully.

Guzman

provided the same answers, and was again judged to have

(PSI, p. 130.)

the hearing

on

his

Rule 35 motion,

ready for probation, but asked the

Guzman

district court t0

stated that he did not believe that he

was

reduce the indeterminate portion 0f his

sentence to ten years so that he could participate in programming earlier. (I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 7, Ls.

7-19.3)

The

district court partially

granted the Rule 35 motion, reducing the indeterminate

portion of Guzman’s sentence to sixteen years. (I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-16.)

explained that

it

relinquished jurisdiction because the only

review hearing indicated that

was “unacceptable.”
completed

Guzman was an

PSE

before

it

The court again

at the jurisdiction

“average or moderate risk to reoffend,” Which risk

(I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 12, L. 17

— p.

13, L. 9.)

While the new PSE

that

after the district court relinquished its jurisdiction but before the hearing

0n

Guzman
his

Rule

35 motion showed “improvement,” indicating that he was “10W to moderate risk to reoffend,” the
district court still

judged

that that risk

court also emphasized that

Guzman

(I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 10-19.)

conduct, and the

sentence t0 give

The

new PSE,

was too high

(Id.)

The

himself stated that he was not prepared for probation.

In light 0f that admission, as well as the nature 0f his criminal

the court determined that

him “two and a half years

district court

to warrant probation in this case.

it

was appropriate

to reduce

Guzman’s

to get himself ready for probation.” (Id.)

then entered an order granting Guzman’s motion under Idaho Criminal

Rule 35 and reducing the indeterminate portion of his prison term

to sixteen years.

(R., pp. 114-

15.)

After appealing t0 this Court,

Guzman ﬁled

a motion requesting that the Court augment

the appellate record with both the six letters 0f support submitted at sentencing, and the six

letters

of support submitted

at the jurisdiction

Suspend the Brieﬁng Schedule and Statement

3

In

the

titled

(Motion to Augment and

in Support Thereof, dated

Citations to “I.C.R. 35 Tr.” are t0 the transcript of the hearing

Criminal Rule 35, contained in the ﬁle
4

review hearing.

May

10, 2019.4)

t0

While

0n Guzman’s motion under Idaho

“46401B.PDF.”

What is apparently a typographical error, Guzman asks the Court to augment the record With
“ﬁve” letters 0f support apparently submitted at the jurisdiction review hearing, but lists six

letter writers.

he attached the former

set

locate the latter set.

(Id.)

(Order Granting Motion t0

0f letters t0 the motion, he represented that the

district court

could not

This Court initially entered an order granting Guzman’s motion

Augment and to Suspend the Brieﬁng

Schedule, dated

May

14, 2019),

but then issued an order denying the motion, because the Court had “been notiﬁed that the

Kootenai County District Court Clerk
ﬁled 0n August

2,

is

unable t0 locate the ﬁve Letters of Support apparently

2018, in Odyssey, and the case ﬁle was previously scanned and shredded.”

(Order Re: Augmentation, dated

May

17, 2019.)

ISSUES

Guzman
I.

states the issues

Whether the

on appeal

as:

by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr.
on the fact that he did not participate in a new
psychosexual evaluation and full-disclosure polygraph examination during
district court erred

Guzman based

solely

the period 0f retained jurisdiction.

II.

Whether the

district court failed t0

thereby depriving Mr.

preserve a sufﬁcient record for appeal,

Guzman 0f his

right t0

due process in

this appeal.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Guzman failed to establish that the district court committed fundamental error by
relying on the evidence before it, including the psychological/psychosexual evaluation
and full-disclosure polygraph completed by Guzman, to determine that it should
relinquish

2.

its

Has Guzman

jurisdiction because

Guzman presented an unacceptable

failed t0 establish that the alleged absence

appellate record violates his due process rights?

0f certain

risk t0 the public?

letters

0f support in the

ARGUMENT
I.

The

District

Court Did Not

Relinquished

A.

Its

Commit Fundamental Error—Or, Abuse

Its

Discretion—When

Based On Its View, Supported By Substantial
Guzman Represented A Danger To The Public

Jurisdiction

It

Evidence, That

Introduction

After pleading guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen (R., pp. 60-61),

waived

Amendment

his Fifth

Guzman

privilege against compelled self—incrimination to participate in a

psychological/psychosexual evaluation (“PSE”) and polygraph examination prior to sentencing

(PSI, pp. 24-25),

which indicated

that

he was a moderate risk t0 reoffend (PSI,

p.

At

13).

sentencing, the district court determined that the nature of the crime and the risk 0f re-offense

implied that probation was not appropriate, and sentenced
years ﬁxed, but retained jurisdiction and informed

Guzman t0 twenty-ﬁve

Guzman

and polygraph examination which demonstrated a 10w
probation after the period of retained jurisdiction.

reiterated in

sentencing order that

its

submit a second

PSE and

it

would

jurisdiction review hearing Without a second

relinquished

27, L.

20 —

its

jurisdiction based

p. 29, L. 9.)

its

View

its

—

it

would consider

p. 21, L. 24.)

jurisdiction if

(R., p. 69.)

PSE and
that

risk t0 reoffend,

Guzman

When Guzman

PSE

It

then

failed t0

returned for his

polygraph examination, the

district court

he posed too great a risk t0 reoffend. (TL,

p.

At the close of the hearing, Guzman’s attorney requested the opportunity

for

Guzman

6),

Which Guzman then did

t0

0n

he submitted a second

(TL, p. 17, L. 10

relinquish

polygraph examination.

that if

years With four

submit t0 the second

Idaho Criminal Rule 35,

PSE and polygraph

(PSI, pp. 111-31).

Guzman acknowledged

At
that

examination

the hearing

(T12, p. 29, L.

12

—

p. 30, L.

on a subsequent motion under

he was not ready for probation (I.C.R. 35

TL,

and the

p. 7, Ls. 7-19),

district court agreed,

reducing his sentence but Without modifying

determination to relinquish jurisdiction (I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 12

On

appeal,

Guzman

had not participated

L. 10

— p.

14, L. 15).

argues primarily that the district court violated his Fifth

privilege against compelled self—incrimination

[he]

,

by relinquishing

new psychosexual

in a

its

its

Amendment

jurisdiction “solely because

evaluation 0r full disclosure polygraph.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) That argument fails for multiple, independent reasons.

Guzman waived

First,

Because he did not obj ect below and

it.

Violation, the fundamental error analysis applies

district court

Guzman

committed fundamental

failed t0 argue

district court’s

statement that

PSE and polygraph
discretion to

below

d0

that the Fifth

examination.

He

submit t0 a second

polygraph to which

district court

PSE and

he

is

way by

the

jurisdiction if he did not submit to a second

did not relinquish

it

was an abuse of

Guzman

was attempting

Guzman

voluntarily submitted.

t0

it

punish

Guzman

was simply

jurisdiction because

Guzman

did not

PSE and

The evidence does not suggest

for failing to submit t0 a second

acting

never invoked his Fifth

While Guzman argues

mistaken.

its

risk t0 reoffend reﬂected in the ﬁrst

0n the evidence before

Amendment

that this case falls into

the privilege against compelled self—incrimination

11),

implicated in any

polygraph examination, but because of the nature of the crime

polygraph examination, but that

incrimination.

an abuse 0f discretion standard applied,

cannot argue now, for the ﬁrst time, that

committed by Guzman and because of the

Third,

that the

so.

Second, the

district court

if

Amendment was

would relinquish

it

alleging a constitutional

and Guzman has not argued on appeal

Even

error.

is

that the

PSE and

it.

privilege against compelled self-

an exception t0 the general rule that

must be invoked (Appellant’s

brief, pp. 10-

Fourth,

Guzman waived

submitting to the ﬁrst

his privilege against

PSE and

examination t0 Which he claims the
t0

the

same

subject.

He

compelled self—incrimination by voluntarily

polygraph examination.
district court

The second PSE and polygraph

attempted to force him to submit was addressed

cannot waive his privilege against compelled self—incrimination

regarding a subject, only to later invoke that privilege regarding that same subject in the same
proceeding.

Next,

Guzman

argues in the alternative that the district court’s sentencing order was

insufﬁciently “speciﬁc or deﬁnite to be enforceable.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) That argument

fails

both because the

relinquish

its

district court

jurisdiction based

evidence before

Finally,

it

perfectly clear, and because the district court did not

on Guzman’s

at the jurisdiction

even

was

failure t0 follow

some

order, but

review hearing.

if the district court

did

err,

Guzman

has not shown that

record that the error actually affected the outcome 0f the proceedings. In

that

any error was harmless and that the

Whether 0r not

it

B.

Standard

district court

had provided Guzman notice of

evidentiary record With a second

PSE and polygraph

its

,

fact, the

would have relinquished
View

that

clear

from the

record reﬂects

jurisdiction

its

he needed t0 supplement the

examination t0 be a candidate for probation.

alleges that a constitutional error occurred at

ﬁrst determine Whether a contemporaneous objection

_

it is

Of Review

“‘Where a defendant

115,

based on the

443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019) (quoting State

(2018)). “‘If the alleged error

was made.’”

V. Bernal,

10

Court] must

State V. Miller, 165 Idaho

164 Idaho 190, 193, 427 P.3d

was not followed by a contemporaneous

reviewed under the ﬁmdamental error doctrine.’”

trial, [this

Li. (quoting Berna],

4

it

must be

at 193,

427 P.3d

objection,

164 Idaho

1,

T0

at 4).

establish fundamental error: (1) “the defendant

the defendant’s

unwaived

must demonstrate

were violated,”

constitutional rights

Q (quoting

that

one or more of

State V.

Pegy, 150

Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010)); (2) the “defendant bears the burden of showing clear
error in the record,”

object

was not a

Which requires both

strategic decision,

Q;

that the defendant establish error

and

(3) the defendant

appellate record” that the error “actually affected the

_, 443 P.3d

at

must show

outcome of the

and

that

trial

that the failure t0

it is

“clear

from the

proceedings,”

Q

at

133-34.

The fundamental

error

analysis

applies

also

where the defendant claims

an

that

unobjected-to constitutional error occurred at sentencing or in the determination Whether t0
relinquish jurisdiction, and including

Where the defendant claims

relinquish jurisdiction violated the defendant’s Fifth

E

self—incrimination.

State V. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174,

therefore hold that the fundamental error test

appellate court

may

proceedings in the

Amendment

is

that the determination t0

privilege against compelled

307 P.3d 187, 191 (2013) (“We

the proper standard for determining Whether an

hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in

trial

all

phases of criminal

courts 0f this state.”); State V. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 819,

229 P.3d

1179, 1181 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying fundamental error analysis to appellant’s argument that

district court violated his Fifth

relying

Amendment

privilege against compelled self—incrimination

on the appellant’s competency evaluation

jurisdiction); State V. Kerr, 163 Idaho 656, 658,

in

determining Whether to

417 P.3d 982, 984

(Ct.

by

relinquish

App. 2018) (holding

that

appellant failed t0 establish fundamental error where he alleged that the district court violated his

Fifth

Amendment

the individual

rights

who

sold

by refusing

him

t0 consider retaining jurisdiction unless the appellant

stolen property).
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named

C.

Guzman Has Waived Any Argument That The District Court Violated His Fifth
Amendment Rights Or Erred BV Relinquishing Its Jurisdiction Based On His Failure T0
Complete A Second PSE And Polygraph Examination

A defendant waives any argument regarding fundamental error if he does not argue in his
opening brief that the fundamental error standard
236, 409 P.3d 81

1,

816 (2018) (holding

Where appellant had “not argued
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)

for

satisﬁed.

m

State V. Baxter, 163 Idaho 23

argument regarding unobjected-to error was

ﬁmdamental

(“When

authority, 0r argument, they will not

that

is

issues

1

,

“futile”

error review”); State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,

0n appeal are not supported by propositions 0f law,

be considered”).

Though Guzman argues on appeal

that the district court violated his Fifth

Amendment

privilege against compelled self—incrimination, he does not address the fundamental error

analysis and argues only that the district court abused

For that reason alone,

Amendment privilege
Perhaps

its

discretion. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-12.)

Court should decline t0 address Guzman’s argument that his Fifth

this

against compelled self—incrimination

Guzman

is

thinking that there

is

was

violated.

a distinction between arguing that the district

court committed an unobjected-to constitutional error

by

Violating his Fifth

through the relinquishment 0f its jurisdiction, and arguing that the
constitutional

Amendment

error

rights.

by relinquishing
If so,

and even

the latter, “‘[a]ppellate court review

its

jurisdiction

if that distinction is

is

in

a

Amendments

district court

manner

that

rights

committed a non-

violated his

comprehensible and he

is

Fifth

arguing only

limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were

presented below.”’ State V. Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)

(alteration in original) (quoting

Nelson

V.

Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379

(2007)).
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While Guzman asked the

district court

review hearing, he never suggested that
suggest that

it

would

court

was

in

jurisdiction at the jurisdiction

any way improper for the

Amendment, and

it

would

its

relinquish jurisdiction unless

(R., p. 69; Tr., p. 20, Ls. 7-20),

district court to

PSE

or polygraph

certainly never argued that the Fifth

prohibited the district court from relinquishing

clear that

examination

was

its

relinquish jurisdiction if he did not submit to a second

examination, never mentioned the Fifth

Amendment

it

not t0 relinquish

Guzman simply

it

jurisdiction.

Though

the district

had a new PSE and polygraph

failed t0 secure a

second

At

that

Guzman

only

polygraph examination prior to the jurisdiction review hearing, with no explanation.
hearing,

When

asked the

the district court indicated that

Guzman
way.
at a

—

would relinquish

an opportunity t0 submit t0 a second

district court for

(TL, p. 29, L. 12

it

p. 30, L. 6.)

jurisdiction,

PSE and polygraph

examination.

Then, though he ﬁled a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35,

again provided no indication that he believed the Fifth

Amendment was

relevant in any

did not provide the district court “an opportunity to consider and resolve disputes

Guzman
time

its

PSE and

when

the error can be prevented, mitigated, or cured.”

State V. Islas, 165 Idaho 260,

_, 443 P.3d 274, 283 (Ct. App. 2019).
Either this Court

Amendment

rights, or

the state contends,

is

it is

reviewing an alleged, unobjected-to Violation 0f Guzman’s Fifth

reviewing a determination t0 relinquish jurisdiction. If the former, as

Guzman

has not addressed the fundamental error analysis and this Court

should decline to consider his argument. But even

0n appeal

that

was never hinted

at

below and which

13

if the latter,

this

Guzman

is

making an argument

Court should decline to address.

D.

Guzman Cannot Show That His
Incrimination Was Violated
“Under the

Fifth

Amendment

Fifth

Amendment

Privilege Against

Self-

privilege against self—incrimination, a criminal defendant

State V. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540,

has the right not to participate in a psychosexual evaluation.”
542, 376 P.3d 744, 746 (2016).

Compelled

The Idaho Supreme Court has held

defendant’s privilege against compelled self—incrimination Where
solely because Defendant refused t0

waive his Fifth Amendment

could incriminate him and result in

new

felony charges.”

that a district court violates a

it

“relinquishe[s] jurisdiction

right

and answer questions

Van Komen, 160

State V.

that

Idaho 534,

540, 376 P.3d 738, 744 (2016).

That precedent does not apply here because (1) the
jurisdiction based

Guzman

on the evidence before

failed t0 submit t0 a

second

it

at the jurisdiction

PSE and

PSE and

polygraph examination.

court’s determination to relinquish

polygraph examination; (2)

jurisdiction

Guzman’s

(3)

was not implicated

For those reasons, even
its

court relinquished

its

review hearing, not solely because

invoked his privilege against compelled self—incrimination; and
privilege against compelled self—incrimination

district

after

if this

Guzman

Fifth

never

Amendment

he consented to the ﬁrst

Court evaluates the

district

on an abuse of discretion standard, and

if

looks past Guzman’s failure t0 raise the issue below, the district court did not abuse

it

its

discretion.

1.

The District Court Relinquished Its Jurisdiction Based On The Evidence Before It,
Not To Punish Guzman For Failing T0 Submit T0 A Second PSE And Polygraph
Examination

Guzman

argues that the district court punished

and polygraph examination by relinquishing
violated his Fifth

Amendment

its

him

for declining t0 take a second

jurisdiction solely for that reason,

rights. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)
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Guzman

is

PSE

and thereby

incorrect as a factual

and

legal matter.

As

discussed further below, he

Amendment under these

circumstances. But he

the district court relinquished

PSE and polygraph

its

is

is

incorrect as to the application of the Fifth

also mistaken factually: the record reﬂects that

jurisdiction not because

Guzman

examination, but because the record before

it

declined t0 submit t0 a second

suggested that

Guzman was

too

great a risk for probation.

State V. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540,

Court

rej ected

376 P.3d 744 (2016), a case

an argument relevantly like Guzman’s under relevantly similar

relevant distinction. Prior t0 sentencing, Jimenez invoked the Fifth

compelled self—incrimination and reﬁlsed
he did

which the Idaho Supreme

in

submit t0 a PSE.

t0

facts, illustrates the

Amendment privilege

Li. at 542,

376 P.3d

against

at 746.5

After

so, the district court stated, in part:

And

Okay.
decision based

And

so that’s the record before me, and

upon the information

so one 0f the reasons

court can understand

who you

have any information, then
nothing

else, or there is

I

and

have, not the information

we have

are

have to make
I

my

don’t have.

a psychosexual evaluation

is

so that the

and what type of a person you are. If I don’t
at the facts 0f this case and pretty much

have to look

very

little

about what kind 0f a person you
tells

I

I’ll

me make a decision
know what you’ve done here, and that

else in the record to help

are. I just

me what kind 0f a person you are, unless there are some other factors.
Now there might be reasons Why you don’t want me t0 know your past,
if you don’t want me to know your past, then I can’t make you tell me; and

you don’t have t0 tell me. But if] don ’t know your past, then
I’m going t0 have t0 justjudge you by the type 0f man I know you are from the
information that ’s before me. D0 you understand?
the Constitution says

Li. at 543,

376 P.3d

at

747 (emphasis

in original) (quoting the sentencing transcript).

court later stated that, “With n0 risk assessment,

I

anything else other than err 0n the side of safety.

safe.

5

As

And

this is the

paramount concern

discussed below, this

is

that

I

think

I

would be improper

it

have

to

must have.”

make

sure

Li. at 544,

The

district

for this court to

we keep

376 P.3d

this

d0

community

at 748.

Jimenez

a very important distinction between this case and Jimenez,

providing an additional reason Guzman’s argument should be rejected.
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argued that the
incrimination

by drawing an adverse inference from

err

his refusal to submit to the

0n the side 0f protecting the community.”

The Court determined

privilege against compelled self-

PSE, “p0int[ing]

an assessment of Defendant’s risk of reoffending, the court

t0 the court’s statement that Without

would

Amendment

district court violated his Fifth

Li. at 543,

376 P.3d

at

747.

that the record did not reﬂect that the district court

had punished

Jimenez or drawn an adverse inference from his invocation of the Fifth Amendment, but

had instead simply recognized and commented on the
decision,

it

would have

to rely

on the evidence before

appropriate and that evidence suggested that probation

“Commenting on

at 748.

evidence

it

t0 determine

was not

PSE

amenability

t0

to

inform

appropriate. Li. at 544,

treatment

in

the

it

its

whether probation was

the fact that Without the psychosexual evaluation there

Defendant’s

regarding

fact that, without a

that

376 P.3d

was a lack 0f

community

and

his

corresponding risk does not constitute drawing an adverse inference from Defendant’s silence.”

Li.

The defendant “obviously was not required

to [submit to a

take into consideration the lack of such evidence

probation.” Li. “There

lack of evidence.”

Li

is

in light

at

is

The Court recognized

544, 376 P.3d at 748.

Amendment

0n the one hand, and informing the defendant

0f the current

probation

deciding whether to place Defendant on

a difference between drawing an adverse inference and recognizing the

punishing a defendant for invoking the Fifth

incrimination,

when

state

0f the evidence, but that a

an option, and then relying on the

the defendant does not submit t0 a

Amendment rights,

PSE], but the court could certainly

PSE.

state

16

between

privilege against compelled self-

that

PSE might

he does not warrant probation

assist the court t0

determine that

of the evidence to relinquish jurisdiction

While the former may

the latter does not.

the distinction

after

Violate a defendant’s Fifth

The

PSE and

district court

Guzman

Prior to sentencing,

latter.

privilege against compelled self—incrimination (PSI, pp. 24-26).

Guzman was

a moderate risk t0 reoffend.

emphasized repeatedly

that

candidate for probation.

it

(PSI, p. 13.)

(TL, p. 17, L. 20

—

That

At sentencing,

considered that risk too high for

Guzman

consented t0 a

waiving his Fifth

full-disclosure polygraph examination (PSI, pp. 13-36), explicitly

Amendment
that

here did only the

to

PSE

reﬂected

the district court

be an appropriate

p. 18, L. 7; p. 20, Ls. 7-20; p. 21, Ls. 16-24.)

The

court noted that:

now

Right

don’t have an evaluation that’s in the ballpark.

I

me

You’re

at

an

you back out in the community, so
probation’s not even an option right now, and it might not be an option when you
come back,
but I need an assessment sometime in the future that indicates that
you’re at a 10W risk t0 reoffend and the reasons Why.
unacceptable risk for

.

(TL, p. 17, L. 24

evidence before

—

.

as a judge t0 put

.

p. 18, L. 7.)

That

is,

the district court informed

particularly in light 0f the

it,

already completed, suggested that probation

jurisdiction,

it

informed him that

it

PSE and

was not an

Guzman

polygraph examination

option.

not supplement the evidence with expert testimony in the form of a

new PSE,
it

t0

the district court simply did

conclude that

relinquishing

when

its

I

it

should relinquish

jurisdiction

sent

what
its

it

said

it

(Id.)

jurisdiction.

The court

to retain

that evidence if he did

new PSE and polygraph

When Guzman

would d0 and

relied

did not present a

on the evidence before

stated that the reason

was because:

you on

this

retained

--

period of retained jurisdiction back on

December 5th, 2017, I had a report from Dr. Wert [the initial PSE] indicating that
you were a moderate risk of sexual recidivism. T0 me that’s entirely too high, and
I was hoping that when you came back that you would have a new assessment of
your

risk,

and

I

don’t see that.
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0f the

Guzman had

While the court agreed

would relinquish jurisdiction based on

examination showing that he was a 10W risk t0 reoffend.

that the state

it

was

— p.

(TL, p. 27, L. 25

new PSE,

ﬂ alﬁ

28, L. 6;

more

the court has “zero

p. 28, L.

—

p. 29, L.

Why I’m

PSE completed by Guzman

self—incrimination

did not Violate

by relinquishing

notwithstanding the fact that

Guzman

that

would

it

rely

it

0n

its

Fifth

In addition

20 —

at least four

that evidence t0 relinquish

against compelled

0n the evidence before

View of the
its

state

occasions

p. 29, L. 6.)

Amendment privilege

jurisdiction based

its

which involved

(Tr., p. 27, L.

Guzman’s

commented 0n

t0 the

reﬂected that he was a moderate risk to reoffend,

0f abuse lasting four or ﬁve hours each occasion.
district court

was n0

you would pose

relinquishing jurisdiction”).)

the district court noted the “shocking” nature of the crime,

The

6 (noting that, because there

insight as to the degree of risk that

public, other people, so those are the reasons

to the fact that the

7

it.

That

is

so

0f the evidence and informed

jurisdiction absent additional expert

testimony suggesting that he was a low risk t0 reoffend.

Guzman

T0 Invoke The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled
Self—Incrimination And Has Not Identiﬁed An Applicable Exception T0 The

2.

Failed

Express Invocation Requirement
“Ordinarily, t0 be afforded the protections of the Fifth

afﬁrmatively invoke the privilege.” State

App. 2017)

(citing

United States

V.

(citing

Garner

When

V.

Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 777, 391 P.3d 659, 662 (Ct.

Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); State

109, 112, 952 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1998)).

individual even

V.

Amendment, a defendant must

the government

is

V.

Crowe, 131 Idaho

“This duty to claim the privilege remains With the

unquestionably attempting t0 compel a response.” Li.

United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976)).

“Although no

ritualistic

formula

is

necessary in order to invoke the privilege, a witness does not d0 so by simply standing mute.”
Salinas V. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 181 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“That requirement ensures that the Government
the privilege so that

it

may either

is

put 0n notice

When

a Witness intends t0 rely 0n

argue that the testimony sought could not be self—incriminating,

18

or cure any potential self—incrimination through a grant 0f immunity.” Li. at 183.

invocation requirement also gives courts tasked with evaluating a Fifth

contemporaneous record establishing the witness’ reasons for refusing

Guzman
claim otherwise.

never

made any

attempt to invoke his Fifth

For that reason, he

relies

Amendment

claim a

t0 answer.” Li. at 183-84.

Amendment

on a narrow exception

“The express

rights

and does not

t0 the express invocation

requirement: the “classic penalty situation.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.) That exception does

Guzman

not apply here.

points t0 the United States

Mugphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984),

as articulating the exception.

who made

involved a probationer

Supreme Court’s decision

in

Minnesota

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

V.

Mugphy

incriminating statements t0 his probation ofﬁcer and later

argued that the statements should be suppressed in a separate criminal proceeding because they

were obtained

in Violation

of the Fifth Amendment.

acknowledged the general rule

Murphy had
429.

that the Fifth

Amendment must be

One such

422-25.

The Court

expressly invoked, which

exception occurs in the “classic penalty situation,” where “the state not only
t0 appear

and

testify,

Amendment privilege by threatening economic
upon him,

to the pressure placed

but also sought to induce

For example, “if the

it

state

.

.

.

failed to assert the privilege,

would be excused, and

Li

at

t0 forgo the Fifth

“succumbed

and disclosed incriminating

in a criminal proceeding.” Li. at 434-

0f the privilege would lead t0 revocation

the classic penalty situation, the failure t0 assert the privilege

the probationer’s answers

in a criminal prosecution.”

him

asserts that invocation

would have created

him

0r other sections,” and the defendant

information, Which the state later sought to use against

0f probation,

at

not done, but explained that there are certain limited exceptions t0 that rule. Li. at

compelled an individual

35.

Mugphy, 465 U.S.

435.
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would be deemed compelled and inadmissible

Mumhy
threatened

by

demonstrates that the classic-penalty exception applies Where the defendant

the state with a penalty for invoking the Fifth

defendant to succumb and

make

self—incriminating statements.

the failure to assert the privilege, the statements

may

later

use them in a separate criminal proceeding. The exception
threatened penalty

may

testimony.”

434

Li. at

Amendment

if the state

attempts to

justiﬁed by the recognition that the

“‘foreclose a free choice t0 remain silent, and

(alterations omitted) (quoting Ga_rner,

privilege, causing the

In such a case, notwithstanding

be suppressed
is

is

424 U.S.

compel incriminating

at 661);

ﬂ 31$ m,

131 Idaho at 112, 952 P.2d at 1248 (holding that the classic-penalty exception to the express
invocation rule applies t0 permit the defendant to seek t0 suppress statements Where the state

compelled the statements, foreclosing the option to remain

silent,

and attempts

t0 use those

responses in a separate criminal proceeding); Poiell, 161 Idaho at 778, 391 P.3d at 663 (“The

Court has recognized that such coercion [creating a classic penalty situation] occurs where the
very assertion 0f the privilege
(internal quotation

is

penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain silent.”

marks omitted)).

was a

In this case, even assuming that there

submit t0 a second
district court’s

PSE.

He

PSE and

threat 0f

some penalty

He

not d0

so.

determination to relinquish

its

jurisdiction,

cannot claim that he was compelled t0

Guzman had

make

U.S. at

did not

435—might

apply.

not completed a second

when he made

that very

incriminating statements because he did

Because Guzman had not taken the second PSE, there

exception—which permits the suppression 0f

Mumhy, 465

Guzman

polygraph examination, he did not “succumb.” At least as of the

cannot claim that the choice t0 remain silent was foreclosed

choice.

if

is

nothing to which the

certain compelled, self—incriminating statements,

Nor

is

there any rationale to support extending the

exception to cases like this one, where the defendant remained silent but did not invoke the

20

Guzman

privilege.

He

PSE.6

Guzman

argues that the state was attempting t0 compel

resisted that alleged compulsion.

not t0 identify his Fifth

Amendment

Amendment

merits of the claim could be addressed

by the

silent,

attempting t0 compel

him

declining to

Having refused

punished him for his silence.

First,

the Fifth

he

t0 submit,

he can and

as providing the basis of that refusal so that the

state

and by the

district court.

make

the

cite

any cases in Which a

was

statements that the state

allegedly

make, but Without invoking the Fifth Amendment, and

to

successfully argued that his Fifth

varieties, neither

submit t0 the second

privilege against compelled self—incrimination as

With one exception, discussed below, Guzman does not
defendant remained

t0

There was no separate coercion or pressure on

the reason for his refusal to submit t0 a second PSE.

should have identiﬁed the Fifth

him

Amendment

rights

were violated when the

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)

Instead,

he

later

state allegedly

cites cases

0f two

0f Which support the View that the classic-penalty exception applies here.
cites cases like

My

Amendment, “succumbed”

and Poiell,

t0

in

which the defendant, without invoking

the alleged attempt to

compel him

to

make

self-

incriminating statements and later argued that the statements should be suppressed because he

was compelled

6

t0

make them. Mugphy, 465 U.S.

Importantly, though

Guzman

was

compelled, the

made

in the

remedy

second

PSE

to

422-25; Powell, 161 Idaho

did submit t0 a second

district court relinquished jurisdiction,

compelled. The reason for that

at

is clear:

Guzman
even

if

is

PSE and

at

776-77, 782,

polygraph examination after the

not arguing that the statements therein were

he could successfully argue that the second

Which he would be

entitled

would
Mugphy, 465 U.S.

PSE

be the suppression 0f statements

in a separate criminal proceeding,

at

435, not the

its jurisdiction.
But, 0f course,
no separate criminal proceeding at issue in this case, and Guzman is not seeking the
suppression of any allegedly compelled statements. Guzman addresses the second PSE only in a
footnote, noting that in Powell the Court 0f Appeals granted relief though the defendant made

reversal of the district court’s prior determination t0 relinquish
there

is

certain allegedly self—incriminating statements.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12 n. 8.) But, as discussed

ﬁthher below, the remedy in Powell was suppression, Powell, 161 Idaho

Guzman

is

seeking here.
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at

781, not the remedy

391 P.3d
his Fifth

661-62, 666 (Where defendant

at

Amendment

classic-penalty

exception

to alleged

self—incriminating statements without invoking

holding that motion t0 suppress should have been granted because

were compelled by the

the statements

succumbed

rights,

made

properly

of punishment).

threat

applies

because,

precisely

compulsion and thereafter sought

These are cases in Which the
unlike

here,

defendant

the

to suppress those statements.

Second, he cites cases in Which the defendant invoked his Fifth

Amendment

privilege

against compelled self—incrimination While refusing to provide certain statements and claimed he

was punished

for doing so.

In

McKune

V. Lile,

536 U.S. 24 (2002), the respondent, an inmate

convicted of rape, “refused t0 participate in the [prison’s sexual abuse treatment program] 0n the

ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would Violate his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self—incrimination,” and argued that he

loss

0f privileges and changes in conﬁnement.

Li. at

was punished

for the invocation

29-327 In Van Komen, When the

by the
district

court asked the defendant t0 take a polygraph examination regarding a relationship with an

underage

girl,

Amendment

“Defense counsel told the court that he would advise Defendant t0 assert his Fifth

rights,”

and the defendant argued 0n appeal

probation due t0 that invocation.

in State V.

t0 a

right

Van Komen, 160 Idaho

Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 417 P.3d 1007

(Ct.

at

that the district court

537-38, 376 P.3d

App. 2018), the defendant refused

against self—incrimination,”

on

and argued 0n appeal

that basis.

IQ. at

that the

district

majority of the Court held that respondent’s Fifth

McKune, 536 U.S.

at

to

submit

Amendment

court relinquished

683-84, 417 P.3d 1009-10. The express invocation

requirement did not preclude consideration 0f the merits of their Fifth

A

741-42. Finally,

polygraph regarding past sexual offenses because “he was asserting his Fifth

jurisdiction improperly

7

at

revoked his

47-48 (plurality opinion); Li
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at

Amendment

48-49 (O’Connor,

Amendment

rights
J.,

challenges

were not

concurring).

violated.

because the appellants expressly invoked the Fifth

Amendment

below. There being no need for

the application of any exception to the express invocation requirement, these cases have nothing

at all t0

d0 With the classic-penalty exception.

The only case
V.

cited

by Guzman

LeVegue, N0. 43877, 2017

WL

that does not fall into

5560270 (Idaho

Ct.

one 0f these two categories

110,

426 P.3d 461 (2018), and afﬁrmed on grounds unrelated

cites

it.

“recommend[ed]”

that

V.

Le Vegue, 164 Idaho

t0 the reason for

Le Veque was on retained jurisdiction when

Which Guzman

the district court

he take a polygraph examination regarding the circumstances of a separate

criminal charge in South Dakota.

State V.

LeVegue, 2017

WL 5560270, at *2.

When Le Veque

did not take the polygraph examination, but apparently without invoking his Fifth

rights, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.

district court violated his Fifth

relinquishing

its

Amendment

Li.

On

appeal, he argued, inter alia, that the

jurisdiction because he failed to take the polygraph.

and had not succumbed
Li. at *4-8.

t0

On

any compulsion,

Amendment

privilege against compelled self—incrimination

Appeals agreed with him, notwithstanding the

situation.”

m

App. NOV. 20, 2017), a decision of the

Court of Appeals that was reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court, State

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.8)

is

fact that

after

Li. at *3.

by

The Court of

he had not invoked the Fifth Amendment

determining that this was a “classic penalty

review, the Idaho Supreme Court did not address the constitutional

question, but held that the district court abused

its

8

discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction because

The Idaho Court of Appeals” decision was afﬁrmed sub n0m., With the Court of Appeals
employing ‘LeVeque’ and the Idaho Supreme Court employing ‘Le Veque’. Except where citing
the Court of Appeals’ decision, the state Will employ ‘Le Veque’ herein. As discussed further
below, Guzman does rely 0n the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Le Vegue for the proposition
that the district court’s order was not sufﬁciently “speciﬁc 0r definite.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.
12-15.) But, With respect t0 the application of the classic-penalty exception, he relies only 0n the
Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in LeVegue. That is because the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision afﬁrming 0n other grounds does not address that issue.
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the

recommendation

t0 submit t0 a polygraph

Le Vague, 164 Idaho

enforce.

at

was not sufﬁciently speciﬁc and deﬁnite

t0

116-1 17, 426 P.3d at 467-68.

As Guzman acknowledges,

the Court of Appeals’ decision in

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11 n. 7.) Nevertheless, he cites

penalty exception applies here.

it

as support for his

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

Court of Appeal’s discussion of that exception
the classic-penalty exception applies.

It

cites

LeVegue

is

View

not precedent.

that the classic-

Like Guzman’s opening

brief, the

no precedent supporting the proposition

cites Powell,

that

Murphy, Van Komen, and LeVeque, 2017

WL 5560270, at *4-6, each of which are discussed above and none of which provide any support
for the

View

that the classic-penalty exception applies here.

Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977), Garner
States V. Antelope,

395 F.3d 1128 (9th

V.

United

Cir. 2005).

States,

In addition,

it

cites

LeVegue, 2017

WL

at

at *4-6.

5560270,

Who

expressly

declining t0 answer the relevant questioning.

Leﬂ<0witz,

803 (noting that appellee moved to quash subpoena as Violating his Fifth

Amendment

invoked the Fifth
431 U.S.

V.

424 U.S. 648 (1976), and United

Antelope and Leﬂ<0witz are irrelevant because they both involved defendants

Amendment When

Leﬂ<0witz

privilege against compelled self—incrimination); Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1131 (noting that sex

offender raise “Fifth

Amendment

challenge” t0 requirement of

They

as part of sex offender treatment program).

random polygraph examinations

are cases in the second category discussed

above: irrelevant because the privilege against compelled self—incrimination was expressly

invoked and so n0 exception t0 the express invocation requirement was
in the ﬁrst category discussed above: while

does so precisely because, unlike here,

made

as a result of alleged compulsion.

it

it

at least

at issue.

Ga_rner

is

a case

concerns the classic-penalty exception,

it

involves a defendant seeking to suppress statements

Garner, 424 U.S. at 656 (“Garner, however, resists the
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application of th[e] [express invocation] requirement, arguing that incriminating disclosures

made

in lieu

0f obj ection are ‘compelled’ in the taX-return context.”).9

Between Guzman’s opening brief and the Court of Appeal’s decision
one case

and

is

cited that actually supports the

LeVegue

that is

analysis.

The

Amendment

itself.

That case

is

View

in

LeVegue, only

that the classic-penalty exception applies here,

not precedent and, respectfully,

is

mistaken in

its

classic-penalty exception excuses the failure t0 expressly invoke the Fifth

privilege against compelled self—incrimination

When

a defendant seeks t0 suppress

incriminating statements that were secured through compulsion, not t0 excuse the failure to

invoke that privilege where the defendant remained

silent

but Without providing any reason Why.

Because Guzman did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
incrimination, he cannot

3.

now

Guzman’s
Voluntarily

“It is

claim that the state violated his Fifth

self-

Amendment rights.

Amendment Privilege Was Not Implicated Because He
Submitted T0 The First PSE And Polygraph Examination
Fifth

well established that a Witness, in a single proceeding,

may

about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self—incrimination

not testify voluntarily

When

the details.” Mitchell V. United States, 526 U.S. 3 14, 321 (1999). “Thus,

questioned about

when

a defendant puts

a matter before the sentencing court, thereby waiving the privilege, the defendant

invoke the privilege as to other matters related to the same subject.”

may

not then

State V. Kerr, 163 Idaho

656, 658, 417 P.3d 982, 984 (Ct. App. 2018).

Prior t0 sentencing,

Guzman

submitted to a

9

PSE and polygraph

examination (PSI, pp. 13-

The Court rejected Garner’s invocation of the classic-penalty exception, holding
was not “denied a free choice t0 remain silent” when he provided information
invoking his Fifth

Amendment

that

rather than

privilege against compelled self—incrimination. Garner,

at 665.

25

Garner

424 U.S.

36), explicitly

pp. 24-25).

waiving his Fifth

At sentencing, because

was a moderate
its

Amendment privilege

PSE and

that

risk t0 reoffend.

that

(TL, p. 17, L. 10

he needed to re-take the

submitted.

Though

it

was

—

PSE and
The

p. 18, L. 7.)

PSE and polygraph

Guzman that

it

would

ﬂ

Guzman

later relinquish

polygraph examination indicating a lower
district court

was thus informing Guzman

examination t0 which he had already voluntarily

after the district court relinquished its jurisdiction,

(Compare PSI, pp. 13-36,

did exactly that.

polygraph examination indicated that

informed

risk t0 reoffend, the district court

jurisdiction if he did not submit another

against compelled self—incrimination (PSI,

pp. 111-32.)

He was

Guzman

eventually

asked the same “relevant

questions” in association With the ﬁrst and second polygraph examination, for example.

(Compare PSI,

p. 31,

self—incrimination

privilege in the

Kin

by

ﬂ

p. 130.)

A

defendant cannot waive the privilege against compelled

voluntarily answering questions regarding a subject, only to invoke the

same criminal proceeding With respect

t0 questions

0n the same

subject.

E

163 Idaho at 659, 417 P.3d at 985 (“[T]he record shows that Kerr told the presentence

investigator that he

knew

preferred not t0 disclose

the

it.

name 0f

The

the individual

district court

who

sold

him

the stolen property but

could properly inquire into that same subject

at

sentencing”).

For related reasons, Guzman’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self—incrimination was
not implicated because he was not at risk of making incriminating statements.
against compelled self—incrimination

may be invoked Where

The

privilege

responding would require making

statements that could be used as incriminating evidence in a separate criminal proceeding, or

When

the statements can be used t0 enhance a sentence. Estrada V. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563-64,

149 P.3d 833, 838-39 (2006).
to a

PSE and polygraph

Guzman had

already been sentenced after voluntarily submitting

examination. Because he had already been sentenced, he could not have
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been subject

to

an enhanced sentence in

this

and polygraph examination on the same

proceeding and, having already submitted to a

subject,

he had already self—imposed any risk that he

might make statements that could be used against him in a second criminal proceeding.
second

PSE and

would put

polygraph examination did not pose some

Guzman

it

deﬁnite t0 be enforced.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

was

trying t0 enforce

when

not attempting to enforce an “order”
jurisdiction because

Guzman was

which

is

additional risk that the state

relied

it

Order

Was

Insufﬁcientlv

it

by doing so was not sufﬁciently speciﬁc or

As

discussed above, the district court was

relinquished

and

it

in

said

its

jurisdiction.

its

It

relinquished

on the nature of the crime and the only PSE before

too great a risk t0 the public for probation

exactly what

p. 20, Ls. 7-20),

District Court’s

argues, in the alternative, that the district court erred in relinquishing jurisdiction

because “the ‘order’ that

that

new and

His

the statements t0 use in a separate criminal proceeding.

Guzman’s Alternative Argument That The
Speciﬁc Or Deﬁnite Likewise Fails

E.

PSE

it

would d0

at the

(TL, p. 27, L. 20

it

—

sentencing hearing (Tr., p. 17, L. 10

t0

its

conclude

p. 29, L. 6),

—

p. 18, L. 7;

sentencing order, Which provided that:

THE COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER PROBATION AT THE END OF
THE PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION WITHOUT A NEW
FULL-DISCLOSURE POLYGRAPH AND NEW PSYCHOSEXUAL
EVALUATION.
(R., p. 69).

While the

district court

relinquish jurisdiction over

did reference

Guzman,

it

its

sentencing order

when

it

determined to

did so to re-emphasize that that additional expert

testimony might have been useful t0 contravene the evidence already in the record before

0n which

it

based

its

determination t0 relinquish jurisdiction, that

reoffend t0 be suitable for probation. (TL, p. 27, L. 20

27

— p.

Guzman was

it,

and

too great a risk to

29, L. 6 (district court noting that

its

sentencing order provided that

examination because the

PSE

it

would not consider probation Without a new PSE 0r polygraph

before

it

at

sentencing indicated

and “what I’m looking for

risk for recidivism,

is [a

new] evaluation,

reduced over the course 0f the work that you did over the
This case

is

therefore clearly distinguishable

Le Vegue, 0n which Guzman exclusively

mic,

relies.

unlike here, the district court relinquished

comply with what the

district court

Viewed

Guzman was

last eight

[to]

”

“entirely too hig

see if that risk

had been

months”).)

from the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15.)

jurisdiction “because

its

as an order to

a

Le Veque

in

Q

First, in

Le Veque did not

to obtain a polygraph

examination.” Le Vegue, 164 Idaho at 115, 426 P.3d at 466. Here, the district court relinquished

its

jurisdiction because

evidence before
affected

by the

it.

it

judged

Though

fact that

Guzman

as a result, the district court

does not follow that the

its

did not submit t0 a second

t0 rely heavily

PSE and polygraph

Again, there

is

it

was

Guzman

it

did

a clear distinction between the district court

0n the evidence before

to submit to the ﬁrst

of the

examination and,

simply because

PSE and

it,

even While recognizing that

polygraph examination but refuse to submit to

the second shaped that evidence, and relinquishing jurisdiction solely because

comply With some

light

on the ﬁrst PSE completed by Guzman,

district court relinquished its jurisdiction

jurisdiction based

Guzman’s choice

be too great a risk to reoffend in

to

of course true that the nature of the evidence before

was forced

not comply With an order.
relinquishing

it is

Guzman

Guzman

did not

order.

Second, in determining that the order in Le Vegue was not sufﬁciently speciﬁc or
deﬁnite, the Court focused

0n the

polygraph examination, and that

it

fact that the district court

was unclear Whether

the

had merely “recommended” a

recommendation was

submit to a polygraph or to the Department of Corrections t0 conduct one.
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t0

Le Veque

Li. at 116-17,

t0

426

P.3d

at

guidance to

Guzman

probation and

possibility

—

Here, the district court repeatedly, clearly, and unambiguously provided

467-68.

how

regarding

its

would need

that evidence

of probation. In

View of the evidence before

of the

light

not complete a subsequent

t0 the jurisdiction

F.

be supplemented for the court

to

district court’s

reasonably argue that he was surprised that the

PSE

concerning his suitability for

indicating he

district court

was a moderate

PSE and polygraph

t0 consider the

statements at sentencing (TL, p. 17, L. 20

along with the court’s sentencing order (R.,

p. 18, L. 7; p. 20, L. 7-20),

for probation given the

it

p. 69),

judged him

t0

risk t0 reoffend

Guzman

cannot

be a poor candidate

and given

that

he did

examination indicating a 10w risk to reoffend prior

review hearing.

Any Error BV The District

Court

Even assuming Guzman can

Was Harmless

establish that the district court erred, he

that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,

have affected the outcome of the
961, 978 (2010).

He

trial

cannot d0

meaning

proceedings.” State

To

so.

(in

V. Per_ry,

“must demonstrate

most instances)

that

it

must

150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d

the contrary, the record

shows

that

any error was

harmless.

The alleged

error in this case involves the district court informing

relinquish jurisdiction based

evidence with a second

0n the evidence before

PSE and

polygraph examination.

statement, there

is

n0 question

evidence before

it,

including the ﬁrst

sentencing,

it

that

would

it

(T12, p.

still

PSE and

stated multiple times that

based 0n that evidence.

it

17, L.

it

Guzman

Had

that

it

would

did not supplement that

the district court never

made

polygraph examination taken by Guzman.

p.
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that

have relinquished jurisdiction based 0n the

did not View

20 —

if

Guzman

Guzman

to

At

be a candidate for probation

18, L. 7; p. 20, L. 7-20.)

It

reiterated at the

jurisdiction review hearing that

(TL, p. 27, L. 20

evidence.

Guzman

statements t0 which

Moreover,

Guzman

explicitly

19).

not a candidate for probation because 0f that

Whether 0r not the

objects, the district court

and

second

that

PSE

that

jurisdiction.

district court

a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 asking the

district court still

sexual recidivism t0 justify probation, and based on

at the

hearing on that motion he

Guzman’s

Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-

believed reﬂected too great a risk of

Guzman’s acknowledgement

for him, the district court declined to reconsider

relinquish jurisdiction, but did reduce

its

examination after the

he was not a good candidate for probation (I.C.R. 35

Based on the second PSE, which the

was not appropriate

had ever made the

indicated a “low-moderate risk of sexual

reduce his sentence (R., pp. 80-81), and

acknowledged

district court

would have relinquished

PSE and polygraph

Guzman ﬁled

(PSI, p. 111.)

district court to

p. 29, L. 6.)

submitted t0 a second

relinquished jurisdiction,

recidivism.”

—

Guzman was

that probation

determination to

its

sentence. (I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 12, L. 10

— p.

14, L.

15.)

Thus, the

district court’s

determination t0 relinquish

0n a second PSE indicating a 10W
Viewed

as too high, as well as

Guzman

district court

Guzman

ultimately played n0 role in

its

moderate risk

Guzman’s admission

does not argue that the

regarding the need for

to

t0

its

jurisdiction

t0 reoffend,

that probation

was based ultimately

which the

district court still

was not appropriate

thereby erred. The district court’s

supplement the evidence before

determination t0 relinquish jurisdiction.
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it

initial

for him.

statements

With an additional

PSE

II.

Guzman Has

Failed

T0

Establish

A Violation Of His Due Process Right T0 An Adequate
Appellate Record

A.

Introduction

At

sentencing, the district court considered six letters 0f support from friends and family

submitted by Guzman, including from: Nesha Green, Jerry Guzman, Michael Guzman, Joseph

Guzman, Sandy

Taylor, and Diane

Appeal Volume

1.)

Those

Guzman.

letters

(T12, p. 6, L.

16 — p.

would not be

appropriate, and that

the support of family and friends if the court granted probation.

1.)

was a moderate

court determined that probation

was not

would relinquish jurisdiction

PSE and

Guzman would have

(Conﬁdential Exhibits — Appeal

risk t0 reoffend, as well as the nature

appropriate, sentenced

four years ﬁxed, and retained jurisdiction.

it

Guzman 0n

But based on the PSE and polygraph examination completed by Guzman, which

indicated that he

that

Conﬁdential Exhibits —

suggested that the district court should place

probation, that a term of imprisonment

Volume

7, L. 9;

if he

(TL, p. 17, L. 10

—

him

district court

made

to

district

twenty—ﬁve years with

p. 21, L. 24.)

It

notiﬁed

did not supplement the evidence before

polygraph examination that indicated a 10W risk t0 reoffend.

review hearing, the

0f the crime, the

(Id.)

it

At

Guzman

With a second

the jurisdiction

the following statement:

I should make record of having
and there’s quite a few so bear With me. There’s a ﬁling on August 2nd, a
letter from Sandy Taylor, a letter from Joseph Guzman, a letter from Jerry
Guzman, a letter from Diane Guzman, a letter from Nesha, N—e-s—h-a, Green, and

A11 right. There’s a couple of other documents that
read,

a letter from Terry

(TL, p. 27, Ls. 11-18.)

It

Guzman,

so I’ve read

then relinquished

its

too great a risk t0 the public. (Tr., p. 27, L. 20

After appealing to this Court,

all

0f those as well.

jurisdiction because

— p.

to

that

Guzman posed

suspend the brieﬁng schedule and

Letters of Support
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judged

29, L. 9.)

Guzman moved

augment the appellate record with “The ﬁve

it

which were apparently ﬁled on

August
16,

2,

2018, and considered by the

2018 (TL, p.27, Ls.1 1-18

district court at the rider

review hearing held on August

(the district court explaining ‘there is a ﬁling

on August 2nd,’ and

noting the letters were written by Sandy Taylor, Joseph Guzman, Jerry Guzman, Diane Guzman,

Nesha Green, and Terry Guzman).” (Motion
and Statement
granting

in Support Thereof, dated

Guzman’s motion.

t0

May

Augment and
10,

2019,

t0

Suspend the Brieﬁng Schedule

p. 2.10)

(Order Granting Motion to

This Court entered an order

Augment and

Suspend Brieﬁng

t0

Schedule, dated

May

motion

Court was notiﬁed “that the Kootenai County District Court Clerk

after the

locate the

ﬁve

14, 2019.)

Shortly thereafter, the Court issued a second order denying the

Letters of Support apparently ﬁled

on August

based exclusively 0n the absence 0f those

letters, this

presume
conclude

(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)

that the letters

that

the

court

He

argues primarily that,

new

district court’s

hearing “so that the record could

In the alternative, he argues that this Court should

support granting

district

p. 19.)

Court should reverse the

determination to relinquish jurisdiction and remand for a

rebuilt.”

17, 2019.)

argues that “the district court’s failure to maintain an adequate record has

deprived him of due process in this appeal.” (Appellant’s brief,

be

unable to

2018, in Odyssey, and the case

2,

was previously scanned and shredded.” (Order Re: Augmentation, dated May

Guzman

is

abused

Guzman
its

probation and, in light of that support,

discretion

by relinquishing

its

jurisdiction.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.)

10

Guzman

moved

augment the record with the six letters considered by the
district court at the sentencing hearing. Those letters are in the record.
Conﬁdential Exhibits
— Appeal Volume 1.) The reference t0 “ﬁve Letters 0f Support” considered at the jurisdiction
also

the Court t0

(E

review hearing was apparently a typographical

error, as

32

Guzman

lists six

alleged authors.

Guzman’s claim 0f a due process
absence of the

letters

Violation fails because he has not demonstrated that the

of support from the appellate record has prejudiced him in the pursuit of his

appeal.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“Where a defendant claims
to the trial court’s

ﬁndings of

that his right t0

fact, if

due process was violated,

supported by substantial evidence.

review[s] the application of constitutional principles to those facts found.”

[this

Court] defer[s]

However,

[it]

freely

State V. Smith, 135

Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

To Show That The Absence Of Any Documents From The Appellate
Record Has Preiudiced His Ability T0 Pursue His Appeal

Guzman Has

A

Failed

defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to a “record 0n appeal that

is

sufﬁcient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below.”

State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472,

create a record are mandatory, failure t0

do so

is

477 (2002). Although

m

legal requirements t0

not automatically reversible error.

W_rigm, 97 Idaho 229, 231-33, 542 P.2d 63, 65-67 (1975) (refusing t0 reverse based on absence

0f transcript 0f prosecutor’s closing argument); State

V.

Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413, 415, 80 P.3d

349, 351 (Ct. App. 2003) (refusing t0 reverse based 0n absence 0f transcript 0f testimony of

state’s witness).

To demonstrate

that the record is not sufﬁcient, the defendant

any omissions from the record prejudiced

his ability t0 pursue his appeal.

Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968); Cheatham, 139 Idaho

at

must show

that

State V. Polson, 92

415, 80 P.3d

at

351.

“[T]o require reversal, some speciﬁc error or prejudice resulting from failure t0 record such
proceedings must be called t0 the court’s attention.”

m

also State V. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65,

W_1‘igm,

97 Idaho

at

233, 542 P.2d at 67.

90 P.3d 278, 290 (2003) (“[E]rror in the abstract

33

does not necessarily

rise to the level

0f constitutional dimension unless and until a defendant

properly presents a speciﬁc prejudice from such error.”).

The

letters

Wholly irrelevant

Guzman

0f support that
t0

Guzman’s argument

claims are missing from the appellate record are

that the district court violated his Fifth

privilege against compelled self—incrimination.

“because Mr.

Guzman

is

Instead,

Guzman

unable to meaningfully argue that the

claims that he was prejudiced

district court failed to sufﬁciently

consider the mitigating information likely contained in those letters.” That

not involve an argument

Guzman

Amendment

is,

the prejudice does

has actually made, but a hypothetical argument based on

mitigating information “likely contained in those letters.”

the information contained in the letters,

He makes n0

by afﬁdavit 0r otherwise.

attempt t0 characterize

This Court does not

automatically reverse a district court order, presuming error, simply because a document or

documents were mistakenly excluded from the appellate record and based 0n speculation
documents might reﬂect

error.

m

W_rigm, 97 Idaho

at

233, 542 P.2d at 67 (holding that the

Court will not “indulge a presumption of prejudicial error” based on failure 0f
record the prosecutor’s closing argument);

m,

that the

92 Idaho

at

district court to

620-21, 448 P.2d at 234-35

(noting that failure to record hearing did not require reversal Where defendant provided no reason

to believe error occurred during hearing).

Nor d0
presume
Illinois,

error

the

two cases 0n Which Guzman

and reverse support

351 U.S. 12 (1956); Smith

relies for the proposition that this

that proposition. (Appellant’s brief, p.

V. State,

20

Court should

(citing

Grifﬁn

V.

146 Idaho 822, 203 P.3d 1221 (2009)).) Neither 0f

34

those cases concern a document missing from an appellate record through inadvertence or

error.“

In

m,

t0 purchase transcripts t0 support

Sm_ith, the Idaho

Supreme Court

the United States

Supreme Court

an appeal, even

rejected an Illinois rule requiring appellants

m,

if indigent.

rejected a statutory

351 U.S.

at 18-20.

In

scheme whereby sexual offenders were

classiﬁed as “Violent Sexual Predators” by the Sexual Offender Classiﬁcation Board based on

evidence and records t0 Which the sexual offender and his 0r her attorney were not provided

access.

Sm_ith,

146 Idaho

at

839-40, 203 P.3d at 1238-39.

They

are cases in Which, as a matter

0f policy or statutory scheme, the appellant was not provided access to records that were
maintained by the

state.

Neither case suggests in any

way that Where

been mistakenly misplaced or destroyed, and an appellant claims

a

document has apparently

that that

document might

possibly support a potential argument on appeal, this Court should presume error and reverse.

The record before

Court

this

speculates might be supported

by

is

adequate t0 address the potential argument that

the letters allegedly missing from the appellate record.

Guzman

assuming, as seems plausible and as

n0 colorable argument

that the district court

Guzman

make

the

abused

argument

that

its

the

Guzman 0n

probation, there

discretion in relinquishing

district

court abused

its

its

11

Guzman

letters,

discretion

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)
intentionally disregarded

makes

is

make

by
that

meritless.

suggests that the absence of these letters “does not appear t0 be the result of a good

faith error since the destruction

rule

but because the argument

is

jurisdiction.

inadequately considering the support of his family and friends not because he cannot

argument without the missing

Even

asks the Court to do, that the letters apparently

missing from the appellate record expressed support for placing

declined t0

Guzman

it

an

error,

To

any

but

it

of those

letters

the extent that

rules, there is

does not

make

did not comport with the applicable rules.”

Guzman

is

suggesting that anyone knowingly and

nothing t0 suggest
it

a bad faith error.

35

that.

That an action violated some

“A

district court’s

decision t0 relinquish jurisdiction

abuse of discretion.” State
retain jurisdiction Will not

V. Statton,

is

reviewed by

this

Court for an

136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001). “‘Refusal to

be deemed a

abuse of discretion’

‘clear

if the trial court

has sufﬁcient

information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under

[I.C. §

19-2521].”’

Li

(alterations in original) (quoting State V.

962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998)). Idaho Code

imposed unless, “having regard

§

Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648,

19-2521 provides that imprisonment should not be

and circumstances of the crime and the

t0 the nature

character and condition of the defendant,” the court

is

history,

0f the opinion that imprisonment

is

appropriate for protection 0f the public because:

(a)

There

undue

is

the defendant Will

risk that during the period

0f a suspended sentence or probation

commit another crime; or

The defendant is in need 0f correctional treatment
effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(b)

(c)

(d)

that

can be provided most

A lesser sentence Will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime; 0r
Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the

defendant; or

(e)

Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the

community; or
(f)

LC.

§

The defendant

is

a multiple offender or professional criminal.

“Thus, a

19-2521(1).

imprisonment

is

trial

court

may deny

necessary to protect society.”

probation if

it

is

of the opinion that

State V. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 607, 167 P.3d

357, 358 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State V. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct.

App. 1990) (holding
offender, despite

that district court acted within its discretion in

denying probation to a sexual

recommendation from the Department 0f Corrections

appropriate, based

0n

district court’s

View

that defendant

36

that probation

posed too great a risk

may be

t0 reoffend).

The

appellate record contains letters 0f support suggesting that

Guzman

granted probation and should not serve time in prison. (Conﬁdential Exhibits

Those

1.)

letters

were before the

— Appeal Volume

and were authored by ﬁve of the

district court

should be

six people

who

allegedly wrote the letters that the district court considered at the jurisdiction review hearing and

24 —

that are not in the appellate record. (Tr., p. 6, L.

district court

considered both sets of

because the

PSE and

indicated he

was a moderate

letters, it initially

ﬁve

hours.

Guzman

—

Guzman.

own

(I.C.R.

35

voluntarily submitted

Subsequently, at a hearing on his Idaho Criminal

assessment and reafﬁrmed
Tr., p. 12, L.

10

The

—

its

View

p. 14, L. 15.)

that probation

Even assuming

Guzman

is

district court

agreed

was not appropriate

for

that the letters apparently

a good candidate for probation, as do

discretion

by judging

too great a risk to the public for probation, particularly in light of

Guzman’s

the letters that are in the appellate record, the district court did not abuse

Guzman was

jurisdiction

trusted him, each occasion of abuse lasting four

(I.C.R. 35 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 12-19.)

missing from the appellate record suggest that

that

the

agreed that he was not a good candidate for probation and that he

needed treatment while incarcerated.
With Guzman’s

Who

p. 29, L. 9.)

Guzman had

its

Though

and because his crime involved the “shocking”

risk to reoffend,

(TL, p. 27, L. 20

Rule 35 motion,

determined t0 relinquish

polygraph examination t0 Which

abuse 0n four to ﬁve occasions of a minor
t0

p. 7, L. 2; p. 27, Ls. 11-18.)

admission that that was

so.

37

its

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm the order 0f the

district court

relinquishing jurisdiction.

DATED this 4th day of October, 2019.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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